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Abstract 
  
2 
 
For many years huge expatriate populations have played a much documented role in 
the economic development of the Gulf monarchies.  But a less well told story is how 
expatriates have also contributed to their political stability.  As non-citizens their 
presence in such large numbers has reinforced the elite status of most citizens in the 
region – an important non-pecuniary legitimacy resource for the various ruling 
dynasties.  Moreover, the primarily employment-driven status of expatriates has 
meant that they have usually adopted either an apolitical or even pro-status quo 
stance.  In some cases their perceived loyalty has led to selective naturalization or 
even direct co-option into security services. Disrupting this decades-old relationship, 
however, have been the recently changing political and economic circumstances of 
the Gulf monarchies.  Already decisions have been made to reduce significantly 
expatriate populations due to accumulating pressures.  Such measures are likely to 
threaten the historic political advantages the presence of expatriates has provided for 
these polities. 
 
 
Expatriates and the Gulf Monarchies: Politics, Security, and the Arab Spring 
  
For several decades the six Gulf monarchies – Saudi Arabia, the United Arab 
Emirates, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, and Oman - have relied on substantial expatriate 
workforces.  This is not only because of the small sizes of their indigenous populations 
relative to the enormous development opportunities that arose since the first oil booms, but 
also because of the benefits and privileges enjoyed by most citizens in these states and their 
subsequent preference for public sector or other perceived high status employment.  There are 
now somewhere between fifteen and nineteen million foreigners employed in these states,
1
 working across all sectors, and from all parts of the world.  Few can ever aspire to 
citizenship and most are strictly temporary guest workers, even if they are highly skilled.  
This paper goes beyond the more conventional political economy discussions on the impact 
of these expatriate populations, most of which have focused on the need for labour 
nationalization strategies,
2
 disparities between public and private sector recruitment,
3
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remittance flows,
4
 or the need for ‘expatriate acculturation’ in order to boost productivity.5  
Instead the focus is on the effect of such a massive expatriate presence on the domestic 
politics of the Gulf monarchies.  Far from being a liability, an argument is made that the 
expatriate presence has historically provided ruling elites with two significant political 
advantages in managing their relationship with indigenous populations, along with a number 
of other peripheral benefits. 
Firstly, from the perspective of the ruling families’ social contracts with their citizens 
– which are frequently used to explain the resilience of these polities6 - the huge numbers of 
expatriates residing and working in the Gulf monarchies have allowed elites to gain further 
legitimacy from citizens beyond conventional wealth distribution strategies or more 
traditional legitimacy resources such as religion, heritage, and cults of personality.  This is 
because the highly visible abundance of expatriates has effectively allowed these states to 
elevate their indigenous populations - the ‘locals’ - to a higher and carefully guarded social 
status above most expatriates, including those from more developed countries.  Secondly, and 
more subtly, instead of presenting security threats or promoting subversive external ideas, 
these largely apolitical, labour migrant communities have usually formed silent 
constituencies that remain keen to preserve the status quo and their employment 
opportunities, even if they suffer from poor working conditions or apparent abuses.
7
 
Nevertheless, with recently changing political and economic circumstances in most of 
these states, there is now compelling evidence that these advantages are being eroded and 
new questions about the role of expatriates must be answered.  In the wake of the broader 
region’s ‘Arab Spring’ or ‘Arab Awakening,’ and as significant unrest has evidently begun to 
spread into the Gulf itself, can expatriate populations still be expected to continue to 
contribute to regime survival prospects?  This seems likely in the smaller and wealthier Gulf 
monarchies where they have formed majorities but remain focused on remuneration and are 
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consistently reminded of their temporary status.  In these circumstances would they likely 
favour most state measures taken to dampen potentially destabilizing dissent among citizens?  
And, as a more direct example, can these states be expected to harness these loyalties by 
either selectively naturalizing certain expatriates or recruiting an ever larger number of 
expatriates directly into their security services?  On the other hand, if unrest continues to 
intensify in the larger and relatively poorer Gulf monarchies and significant pressure resulting 
from higher public spending and the urgent need to create employment opportunities for their 
younger nationals continues to build, might expatriates after all become an unnecessary and 
unwelcome presence? 
 
Citizens, expatriates, and socio-economic exclusivity 
Given that most of the well-documented aspects of the welfare state and the various 
hydrocarbon rent-financed wealth distribution mechanisms in the Gulf monarchies – 
including generous government housing, free education and health care, and often substantial 
social security payments
8
 - are geared primarily towards citizens, it has become increasingly 
important for these states to develop carefully a sense of distinction and exclusivity for such 
recipients.  On a basic level, governments need to control exactly which of their residents are 
entitled to the many privileges and benefits of such rent-based states and, especially in the 
more resource-scarce monarchies, there is a need to make sure that the distribution of 
national wealth does not become too diluted.  Moreover, the building of a clear social divide 
between citizens and expatriates, especially in those Gulf monarchies such as Qatar, the 
UAE, and Kuwait – where the vast majority of residents are expatriates – has also created a 
readily identifiable elite status for nationals.  Put simply, in these monarchies almost any 
bona fide citizen, regardless of background or education, can automatically assume a 
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relatively high social standing, courtesy of their passport, identity papers,
9
 or ‘family card.’10  
For many years – and controversially this is sometimes still the case – this meant in practice 
that citizens could queue-jump expatriates, win arguments with traffic police (especially if 
the adversary was an expatriate) and in general enjoy preferential treatment in public.  While 
this obvious social stratification is now becoming a little blurred – notably in the UAE’s 
Dubai and those monarchies that have sought foreign direct investment or have established 
tourism industries
11
 – there nevertheless lingers an atmosphere of favouritism and state-
sponsored social inequity.  Nevertheless, from a ruling family’s perspective any social 
discomfort or resentfulness that expatriates may experience is massively outweighed by the 
political benefits of having a national population that not only enjoys distributed wealth but 
also de facto higher status. 
Also contributing to the economic and social exclusivity experienced by citizens vis-
à-vis expatriates has been the region’s much discussed sponsorship or ‘kafala’ system.  While 
some of the more resource-scarce Gulf monarchies, notably Bahrain and Dubai have gone to 
great lengths to liberalise their economies and create a more equitable competitive 
environment for foreign entrepreneurs and investors – either by removing the sponsorship 
requirement in the free zones or by allowing ministries rather than individuals to serve as 
sponsors
12
 – most Gulf states have shied away from abolishing the system outright, given the 
significant economic benefits it brings to many citizens.  In the most straightforward 
examples, well placed nationals can essentially sell their status as a citizen to foreign partners 
who need to conform to existing legislation (such as having a sponsor control at least fifty-
one percent of the company’s stock13) and seek a local partner.  In these situations it is not 
uncommon to find that the local partner is effectively a ‘silent partner,’ with the expatriate 
often being responsible for the day-to-day running of the company.  As such, the system has 
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often allowed citizens to enjoy another stream of income above and beyond any public sector 
salary, land, or property that they may have acquired with the help of the state.   
 
Expatriates and the status quo 
While accurate figures for the size of Gulf expatriate populations are difficult to come 
by, perhaps due to the sensitivities of governments admitting to full demographic 
breakdowns, it is still possible to make useful generalisations.  Most of the region’s unskilled 
labour force (usually housed in worker camps outside the main cities) is made up of South or 
East Asians, while most of the retail and service sectors are made up of South Asians, East 
Africans, or non-Gulf Arabs.  Westerners, Australasians, and South Africans, along with 
educated South Asians and non-Gulf Arabs make up a significant proportion of the region’s 
professional class and white collar private sector workforce.  Saudi Arabia probably reached 
a peak of about eight million expatriates in early 2013 – nearly a quarter of the total 
population.
14
  In the more resource-scarce Oman, where there are fewer economic 
opportunities, there are unsurprisingly fewer expatriates.  Nevertheless, there are probably 
still more than 600,000 foreigners living there, accounting for some seventeen percent of the 
total population.
15
  Meanwhile in Bahrain about 550,000 or nearly half of the island’s 
population are thought to be expatriates – or at least were before the 2011 uprisings began.16  
The most dramatic examples are, however, in the very resource-rich small monarchies.  
Kuwait reached a peak of over 1.1 million expatriates in early 2013 - account for nearly 
seventy percent of the total population,
17
 while in the UAE expatriates continue to make up 
about ninety percent of population.
18
  The latter figure is based on official UAE government 
data claiming that the total population has risen to 9 million
19
 – this has however been widely 
disputed and may be put down to the UAE’s historic rivalry with the much larger Saudi 
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Arabia.  Qatar, now the fastest growing Gulf economy with the smallest number of citizens – 
only 290,000 - will soon catch up with the UAE.  Already the population comprises eighty 
percent expatriates, and with a staggering annual population growth rate of nearly sixty 
percent their proportion will increase dramatically.
20
 
While these figures may seem alarming, most of these millions of expatriates are 
undoubtedly based in the region to make money and eventually return to their home countries 
relatively better off.  Most only stay in these states for two to five years, with very few 
regarding their host country as a real home or a retirement destination.  In this regard they 
differ greatly from immigrants who arrive in ‘melting pot’ cities such as New York, London, 
and Paris – many of whom intend to spend a substantial part of their lives there and 
eventually help shape the societies and politics of their adopted nation.  Gulf expatriates are 
thus better viewed as strictly temporary economic migrants.  Although, as described, they are 
very rarely entitled to the full benefits enjoyed by citizens, they nevertheless enjoy a tax free 
salary which is usually allows a higher standard of living than they would experience in their 
country of origin.  In many cases they have no sustained interest in the politics of their host 
country, or if they do, it rarely feeds into indigenous opposition movements.  In many ways 
they become a loyal, silent support base for the ruling families, as the latter usually portray 
themselves as the guardians of stable, fairly apolitical states where money can be made safely 
and smoothly and there is no requirement to integrate into the local culture or acquire the 
local language.   
Currently it is the tiny kingdom of Bahrain that perhaps provides the best example of 
this phenomenon, as its ruling family is undoubtedly facing the stiffest local opposition.  In 
summer 2013 the Bahrain Federation of Expatriate Associations began an overtly pro-
government petition – aiming for 100,000 signatures – calling for ‘peace and prosperity’ and 
the ‘unification of citizens and expats’ under the Al-Khalifa king.21  Less dramatically but 
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more structurally significant,  the UAE’s has long provided a good example of expatriate 
integration into a ‘state as a corporation’ model, rather than a community, with senior 
ministers having claimed that ‘the government emphasizes prosperity over political 
development… we think twenty percent politics / eighty percent development.’22  On a more 
micro level the ruler of the UAE’s constituent emirate of Dubai goes even further than this.  
Styling his make-shift government as ‘Dubai Incorporated’ or ‘Dubai Inc.’, his aim has been 
to portray himself as the chief executive officer of a corporation, rather than as an autocrat 
presiding over an unelected government.
23
  As the emirate’s indigenous population has 
continued to shrink, relative to the influx of hundreds of thousands of expatriates each year, 
the government often announces new initiatives to hold the situation in check – seemingly an 
effort to appease conservatives.  But in many ways spiralling expatriate numbers have suited 
the Dubai ruler’s interests well – even if it alarms the dwindling citizenry –as he is able to 
govern over a city mostly made up of temporary migrants.   
For the minority of expatriates who remain in the Gulf monarchies much longer, the 
formula needs to be a little different.  There are communities of Palestinians in Kuwait, 
communities of Iranians and Indians in Dubai, and other substantial foreign populations in 
the region that have spent decades living and working there, sometimes even having been 
born and brought up there, as children of expatriates.  Although a small minority do seek 
naturalisation, as discussed below, this is often controversial with indigenous populations and 
has become a source of grievance for some opposition movements.  Instead, most of the Gulf 
monarchies have preferred to create an atmosphere of sanctuary or unofficial asylum for 
these communities, even if it is illusory and contingent on current international relations.  
Very often these expatriates are from underdeveloped or war-torn regions, many of whom 
either cannot return home or – in the case of Kuwait’s hundreds of thousands of Palestinians 
(or at least those who were not expelled following the emirate’s liberation from Iraq in 
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1991
24
) – have no valid travel documentation.  While most are aware that their livelihoods are 
at the whim of their hosts (many other nationalities apart from Palestinians also have been 
deported from Gulf monarchies due to state-level political disputes),
25
 there is a general 
acceptance of the status quo.  Thus, as with the more temporary migrants, most of these 
expatriates prefer to live quietly and apolitically, or try to save up enough to emigrate 
elsewhere. 
Much international media attention focuses on the plight of the huge population of 
unskilled expatriates.  In particular, the appalling living conditions in some of the workers’ 
camps – some of which have no basic facilities or even sewerage – are routinely portrayed as 
a manifestation of evil, immoral, slave-based economies.
26
  There is certainly much truth to 
this, with ‘workers’ often viewed as somehow sub-human by citizens and skilled expatriates 
alike, and usually discriminated against by apartheid-like regulations (for example, not being 
allowed to enter shopping malls, parks, museums, and in some cases even ‘public’ squares).  
But in many ways this outrage is primarily the result of having what appears to be a first 
world society occupying the same uncomfortably small spaces as a developing world society.  
Very few of the workers can be considered slaves, and most have not made a step into the 
unknown.  In many cases these men have followed their fathers, brothers, or other male 
relatives who have worked there before, usually with the same bad conditions.  Most are still 
separated from their passports upon arrival, driven around on cattle trucks, and work 
punishingly long hours in very high temperatures.  Sometimes they do not return home for 
two or three years at a time.  But this unpleasant set-up is usually expected and known to the 
new arrivals, and most are there – just like the skilled expatriates – to make more money than 
they could at home.
27
 
In this light the unskilled workers are best viewed as the dark side of a tragic, 
remittance-based economic system where poor but manpower-rich countries sell their labour 
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in exchange for remittances and investments from the Gulf states into their impoverished 
communities.  When riots do break out in the labour camps the roots causes are only very 
occasionally political,
28
 and the disturbances have yet to pose any real threat to the survival of 
the Gulf monarchies.  Usually, they are the result of workers not having been paid by an 
unscrupulous employer or perhaps an unsafe workplace or some other labour-specific 
complaint.  Sometimes governments will move fast to address the problem and deport a few 
of the ringleaders.  But in many cases there is no need for fast action as the workers’ 
embassies usually remain silent – unwilling to champion the interests of their countrymen lest 
they jeopardise the flow of remittance wealth.  According to a study conducted by Saudi 
economists, the kingdom now is ranked third in the world for foreign labour cash transfers, 
behind only the United States and Switzerland, with approximately $28.5 billion per year 
being remitted.  The other Gulf monarchies, notably Kuwait and the UAE are thought to be 
close behind.
29
  A noteworthy exception to ambassadorial silence came in September 2013 
when the Nepalese ambassador to Qatar claimed that her countrymen were effectively living 
in an ‘open jail.’  She was, however, promptly recalled to Kathmandu within days of her 
remarks being reported in the British press.
30
 
  
Expatriates and the Arab Spring 
 Since the beginning of 2011, and especially in the wake of 
the North African, Syrian, and Yemeni revolutions, most of the Gulf monarchies have 
experienced significant turbulence of their own as the region-wide, ongoing Arab Spring 
appears to have emboldened opposition groups throughout their territories.  This resistance 
has ranged from almost full-blown revolution in Bahrain to mass street protests in Kuwait, 
and demonstrations in various parts of Saudi Arabia and Oman.  Even in the UAE over a 
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hundred political prisoners have been put on trial with several dozen being jailed, most of 
whom have been calling for an elected parliament.
31
  In Qatar there have also been a small 
number of arrests and imprisonments for those who have criticised the ruler or the region’s 
autocratic system.
32
  In line with the arguments put forward earlier in this paper, almost all 
of those involved in the ‘Gulf Spring’ thus far have been citizens.33  Only a tiny fraction of 
the several hundred political arrests that have taken place in the monarchies over the past 
two years have been expatriates, and none of the protestors that have thus far died in 
Bahrain,
34
 Saudi Arabia,
35
 and Oman
36
 have been expatriates.   Most of this resistance has 
been contained, thus far, by well documented strategies of ramping up public spending – in 
other words extending the aforementioned wealth distribution strategies – or, if necessary, 
intensifying repression.  There have, however, also been parallel containment strategies that 
have involved the co-opting of expatriates and other foreign nationals. 
 Among these, and most apparent in Bahrain, has been the 
recent escalation of a long-running ‘selective naturalization’ process.  Notably, a sectarian 
imbalance that has historically placed the Sunni Muslim ruling family and its closest allies 
in a minority vis-à-vis the much bigger indigenous Shia population continues to be tackled 
by offering large numbers of Sunni Arab expatriates full Bahraini citizenship.  This is 
significant as the Shia community has for many years complained of unfair treatment by the 
government and, understandably, has usually been at the forefront of any opposition.  In 
particular, following the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran and the Bahrain ruling family’s 
claims in 1981 that they had uncovered a pro-Iran plot,
37
 the persecution of Bahrain’s Shia 
increased.  The resulting tensions, along with a widespread belief that Shia were being 
discriminated against in terms of employment opportunities and state benefits, eventually led 
to a full scale intifada in the 1990s which claimed the lives of over forty protestors and led to 
the jailing and exiling of several major opposition figures.  Moreover, in 1996 the 
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government claimed to have uncovered a fresh Shia plot, this time by an Iran-backed offshoot 
of Hezbollah in Bahrain.
38
  By the end of the intifada and the launch of a ‘national action 
charter’ in 2001, approximately seventy to seventy-five percent of Bahrain’s national 
population were still believed to be Shia – mostly indigenous Shia Arabs39 or ethnically 
Persian Arabs who had long been settled on the island.
40
   
 Since then it is believed that the proportion of Sunni 
Bahraini citizens has increased, mostly due to government manipulations and ‘demographic 
engineering.’  In 2006 details unexpectedly came into the public domain following the 
publication of a lengthy report by Salah Al-Bandar – a British citizen of Sudanese origin who 
had been working for Bahrain’s Ministry for Cabinet Affairs.  The report – soon dubbed 
‘Bandargate’ - claimed to have uncovered a secret plot by a group within the government to 
‘deprive an essential part of the population [the Shia] of their rights.’41  Moreover, it inferred 
that the group was trying to turn the Shia into a minority within just a few years and was busy 
working on ways to gerrymander electoral constituencies so as to reduce the clout of Shia 
members of parliament.  Although Al-Bandar was promptly deported and the state-backed 
media was banned from reporting on the story, a popular protest took place demanding a 
thorough investigation.
42
  In 2008, following the publication of official figures indicating that 
Bahrain’s total population had increased by more than forty percent between 2002 and 2007, 
tensions increased further, as it was deemed unlikely that all of the increase was due to 
natural growth or the naturalisation of stateless persons.  Analysts have claimed that the 
natural rate of growth for the national population would have only yielded an increase of 
47,000 persons, thus more than 72,000 were probably granted citizenship during this period.
43
  
Indeed, in summer 2010 opposition groups in Bahrain estimated that between 65,000 and 
100,000 Sunni nationals had been added to the country’s voter rolls over the previous decade.  
Most of the newcomers
44
 seem to have been housed in brand new villages in Bahrain’s 
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hinterland, suitably distanced from the older, predominantly Shia villages.  Moreover, many 
seem to be working for the state security services, the police, or the royal court, likely due to 
their unswerving loyalty to the government.  Interviewed by the New York Times in summer 
2010, a resident of one such village – a settlement specifically for Sunnis employed in the 
security sector – stated that he and his two brothers worked for the police and that ‘…if the 
Shia took control of the country, they would pop out one eye of every Sunni in the country.’45  
In the period since Bahrain’s ‘Pearl Revolution’ mass uprisings that began on 14 February 
2011 the demographic engineering policy seems to have been further accelerated, with 
government officials now often claiming that Bahrain’s population is more or less balanced 
’fifty-fifty’ between Sunni and Shia, and with reports that new Sunni settlements are being 
physically ring-fenced to separate them from existing Shia communities. 
 Also very evident in Bahrain and increasingly apparent in 
the UAE – has been the direct hiring of foreign nationals into the security services without 
any specific promise of naturalization.  Mercenaries are nothing new for these monarchies,
46
 
nor is the hiring of senior western expatriates into executive security positions.  Very recent 
examples of the latter include former London Metropolitan Police assistant commissioner 
John Yates who continues to work for Bahrain, and Ronald Flanagan, a former Northern 
Ireland chief constable who worked for the UAE’s ministry for interior for two years, during 
which he served as an expert witness in British courts presenting evidence in favour of the 
UAE government.  But mass rank and file expatriate recruitment in this sector has become 
demonstrably far more visible in the wake of the Arab Spring.  Notably, in the days and 
weeks after the 14 February protests in Bahrain, reports began to circulate that the 
government was trying to bolster its security services with fresh mercenaries from Pakistan 
and elsewhere.  Having always had a substantial contingent of Pakistani nationals serving in 
its security sector, along with many Jordanian and Yemeni soldiers, it appears that the 
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authorities were trying rapidly to increase rapidly the number of non-Arabs in their 
employment, presumably on the grounds that such foreigners would be more willing to open 
fire on Bahraini nationals.  A Pakistani conglomerate with close links to the Pakistani 
military was understood to have been recruiting and airlifting thousands of soldiers to 
Bahrain, while adverts for the ‘Urgent Need of the Bahraini National Guard’ had begun to 
appear in Pakistani newspapers soon after the first protests in Bahrain.
47
  Later in 2011 
reports began circulating that Bahrain was also trying to recruit from Indonesia and Malaysia, 
with a noted Saudi scholar claiming that the ‘Bahraini monarchy was at the end of its rope’ 
and that ‘they [the monarchy] do not trust even the loyalists in Bahrain so they need to seek 
mercenaries from elsewhere — and these mercenaries will one day be captured and tried in 
public.’48  Since then, it appears that the strategy has continued unabated, with a common 
grievance among many Bahraini opposition activists being that the men confronting their 
demonstrations are often not even Bahraini, and sometimes not even Arab. 
Meanwhile in the UAE, as revealed by the New York Times in an extensive May 2011 
report based on documentary evidence, the crown prince of Abu Dhabi had been employing 
the founder of Blackwater, a private military company, to create a secret 800-strong force 
made up of Colombian and South African fighters.  At a cost of over $500 million, a base had 
been constructed in Abu Dhabi's interior and the men brought into the UAE posing as 
construction workers.  According to the documents associated with the project, the force's 
raison d'être was to conduct special operations missions inside and outside the country, 
defend oil pipelines and skyscrapers from terrorist attacks, and - crucially - 'put down internal 
revolts.'  Further to this latter objective, the report also stated that the Blackwater founder was 
under strict instructions to hire no Muslim mercenaries as 'Muslim soldiers... could not be 
counted on to kill fellow Muslims,' while another document associated with the project 
described possible 'crowd-control operations where the crowd is not armed with firearms but 
15 
 
does pose a risk using improvised weapons such as clubs and stones.'
49
  As with Bahrain it 
appears that the UAE’s mercenary recruitment programme is very much ongoing.  Notably, 
in June 2013 the Financial Times reported on the Colombian government’s frustration over 
the ‘exodus’ of hundreds of its ‘highly trained’ security sector professionals to the UAE.50  
While the South African contingent is understood to be focused on anti-pirate training, the 
Colombians are thought to be focused on the other, internal security issues.
51
    
 Evidence of foreign nationals being recruited into security 
services of the other Gulf monarchies has been patchier.  Nonetheless in 2011 a number of 
reports claimed that the Saudi authorities were seeking foreign mercenaries to join their 
security forces.  In June 2011 a report claimed that ‘the Saudis are doing the same [as 
Bahrain], trying to invite Indonesia and Malaysia to send military troops to protect the 
monarchy, and we see that from Jordan as well.’52  Similarly it was reported by Al-Jazeera 
that the chairman of the Saudi National Security Council
53
 had made ‘two quiet trips to 
Pakistan to seek their support in case protests erupted at home.’  With the Pakistani media 
claiming that the Pakistani prime minister had told the Saudi visitor that ‘...his country 
supported the Saudi stance in the Gulf and the Middle East and would stand by Riyadh for 
regional peace,’ one observer remarked that ‘the potential need for foreign troops in case 
protests spiral out of control has forced the Saudis to work with the current Pakistani civilian 
government for whom they have nothing but utter contempt.’54   
 In Kuwait, the issue has become similarly contentious, with 
one of prominent opposition figure Mussallam Al-Barrak’s most controversial statements 
being that he feared the authorities were planning on hiring or had already begun hiring 
Jordanian nationals into the security services.
55
  While there is no evidence this has taken 
place or has been discussed in Kuwait, it is likely that the increasing cooperation, including 
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massive financial aid, between the Gulf monarchies and the manpower-rich surviving Arab 
monarchies of Jordan and Morocco has fuelled these fears.  Indeed, following announcements 
in late 2011 that the Gulf Cooperation Council would provide both of these states with $2.5 
billion as part of a five year development plan, the deal was viewed by some analysts as 
being a ‘…consolidation of monarchies that are solidly Sunni’ and with the ‘…attraction [for 
the Gulf monarchies] being assistance… from [Jordan’s] well-trained military.’56  Similarly 
Reuters reported that the deal reflected the Gulf monarchies’ need for ‘…closer ties with 
Arab kingdoms outside the Gulf as part of efforts to contain the pro-democracy unrest that is 
buffeting autocratic ruling elites throughout the Arab world.’57  And in June 2013, ahead of 
expected protests, the official Kuwait government news agency reported that the minister for 
the interior’s undersecretary had received Jordan’s director general of national security.  At 
their meeting the Kuwaiti official expressed his admiration for Jordan’s ‘experience in 
security’, called for greater ties, and stressed that Kuwait’s relations with Jordan were ‘strong 
in terms of coordination and cooperation in the security field.’58 
 
After 2013: expatriates in question 
As a consequence of the post-2011 increases in public spending, and in particular the 
need to create even more public sector jobs in an effort to maintain political acquiescence 
from increasingly vocal citizens, there is now a very visible trend in some of the Gulf 
monarchies to ‘crack down’ on expatriate numbers, seemingly in an effort to free up 
immediately jobs for nationals and rapidly cut government costs.  The urgency behind this is 
now palpable in a number of these states, with Bloomberg reporting in December 2012 that 
Saudi Arabia had pledged $500 billion over the previous year on social welfare and on 
‘projects that would ensure that the country remained unscathed by the kind of political 
17 
 
unrest that swept through other Arab countries… [the king] is using oil money to fight high 
unemployment – about a quarter of Saudis aged twenty to thirty don’t have jobs – and to 
build schools and hospitals… the budget has more than doubled since 2006.’59  Meanwhile, 
with regards Oman, where ‘steep government hiring’ and a raising of the minimum wage for 
private sector Omani employees has been introduced since protests in 2011, the International 
Monetary Fund warned in June 2013 that the budget was becoming unsustainable.
60
  Equally 
alarmingly, World Bank officials have warned that even ostensibly oil-rich Kuwait would 
‘probably soon find it hard to sustain its level of government spending in the medium term’ 
due to a series of large public sector pay increases intended to stave off pressures from 
‘increased union activities since last year’s Arab uprisings in the region.’61 
These conditions have already led to large numbers being deported in most of the 
Gulf monarchies over the course of 2013.  Historically there have been many amnesties for 
illegal residents in the region, allowing such expatriates to leave without penalty, and this 
trend has continued, albeit with some considerable intensification.  In Oman, for example, it 
is thought that 400 to 600 expatriates are being deported each month, being described as 
‘infiltrators,’62 while in the UAE about 12,000 were deported over the few months following 
the end of a visa amnesty in February 2013.
63
  But in some of the Gulf monarchies this 
current phenomenon has gone much further than merely targeting illegal residents, with even 
large numbers of long-serving, legally employed expatriates having their contracts abruptly 
terminated and with what have been described as ‘trivial reasons’ being given for the 
immediate deportation of many other expatriates.  This has led to a palpable culture of fear 
developing in some expatriate communities, with many having witnessed their colleagues or 
relatives being rounded up or struggling to finalize their affairs and vacate. 
The deportations in Kuwait have attracted considerable attention, due to the scale and 
speed with which they have taken place.  Government spokespersons have stated that the 
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number of foreigners in Kuwait will be reduced by 100,000 each year for the next decade on 
the grounds that ‘it is the right of any state to take appropriate legal action to ensure stability 
and security of the country.’  A large number of expatriates are already thought to have been 
deported, with reports that many small businesses run by South Asians have closed and entire 
residential districts feel empty.
64
  Several Kuwaiti government departments and agencies 
appear to be involved in the deportations and other associated cutbacks, with a reported 
12,000 expatriates having been deported over the past year for traffic violations alone,
65
 and 
with the contracts of several hundred expatriate teachers being terminated as they reached the 
age of sixty – despite a law having earlier been introduced that raised the age of retirement in 
the public sector to sixty-five.
66
  Other restrictions have been imposed on expatriates, 
seemingly in an effort to cut costs and make Kuwait a less hospitable environment for foreign 
workers.  These include the limiting of access to government hospitals to only nationals in the 
mornings, and a considerable tightening of the requirements for expatriates to gain a driving 
licence.  Overall, the situation has been described in the tabloid press as being like a ‘scary 
movie’ for expatriates, with some even being fearful to take lifts in other people’s cars or 
even step outside their accommodation.
67
  In June 2013 jails were reported to be 
overcrowded, as more than 25,000 arrested in various raids were awaiting decisions on 
possible deportation.
68
  Even the usually compliant embassies and governments of the labour 
supplying countries have begun to take action, either issuing explanations to their nationals, 
or offering practical advice on how to avoid arbitrary deportation.  The Malawi minister for 
labour, for example, announced that her administration had been ‘thrown off balance by the 
last minute indefinite suspension of Malawi labour in Kuwait.’  He complained of the 
scenario that ‘this is what happens when you are a beggar.’69  Meanwhile the Indian and 
Bangladeshi embassies called on Kuwait to introduce an amnesty period to allow their 
nationals to leave before deportation and ‘conveyed their concern that legal peoples should 
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not be deported, and that those deported should be paid their salaries.’70  The Indian embassy 
believed that around 3600 of their nationals had been deported over the first half of 2013, and 
of these more than two thirds held legal passports.
71
  The Philippines embassy has also been 
active, telling their nationals ‘these events will pass, use your common sense, adapt’ and ‘not 
to panic.’  One leaflet, describing the embassy’s ‘roving teams’ that were ready to help 
Filipinos on the brink of deportation, even told its frightened nationals that ‘in the words of 
Winston Churchill… this is our finest hour.’72 
But it is in Saudi Arabia that the most dramatic developments have taken place, with 
over a million deportations having taken place over the past year, often with accompanying 
riots and violence.  Rooted in a pre-Arab Spring plan to gradually ease out expatriates in 
favour of nationals, the ‘nitaqat’ or ‘ranges’ system (which rewards sectors with higher ratios 
of nationals to expatriates) is beginning to come into effect.
73
  A deadline was initially set for 
July 2013, with all employers warned that if they had not met their designated ratios they 
would be penalized, while expatriates who remained in the country beyond their termination 
date and without valid residency papers would be jailed and deported.  Although the deadline 
was then extended to 4 November 2013, already the Indian embassy had issued over 90,000 
emergency exit visas to its nationals in the country, while dozens of thousands of other 
foreign nationals had already returned home due to the scheme.
74
  Meanwhile Pakistan 
repatriated 50,000 of its nationals ahead of the revised deadline, with a consequent impact on 
the flow of remittances between the two countries.  It was estimated that monthly remittances 
from Saudi Arabia to Pakistan dropped by $23 million in May 2013 and by over $50 million 
in June 2013.
75
  The impact on Egypt and Yemen’s economies is likely to have been even 
more significant, with reports that up to 300,000 Egyptians left the kingdom over the summer 
period,
76
 while expulsions to Yemen thought to have taken place at a rate of about 2000 per 
day,
77
 with a total of 210,000 expected to return.
78
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In the days and weeks following the expiration of the 4 November deadline, violent 
clashes broke out in several Saudi cities, with large communities of expatriates – many of 
whom had reportedly lived and worked in the country for many years - violently resisting 
arrest.  In some cases pitched street battles took place between ‘illegal expatriates’, security 
forces, and vigilante citizens.  In January 2014 the Ministry for the Interior nonetheless 
confirmed that quarter of a million had been rounded up and deported in the space of just 
three months.
79
  Predictably, perhaps, jobs that had been vacated by expatriates were not 
assumed by Saudi citizens, especially in manual labour.  Major investments houses in the 
kingdom have claimed that nearly $27 billion in construction, transport, and retail projects 
have been cancelled or delayed.
80
  As with Kuwait, despite these inevitable problems that 
Saudi Arabia’s economy will face as a result of such a rapidly shrinking expatriate labour 
force, it seems unlikely that the trend will be reversed, with influential pro-government 
commentators now claiming that ‘these foreigners are a huge elephant in the room despite the 
country’s ampleness, the financial ability of its residents, and their vast experience’ and 
arguing that the kingdom’s crumbling cities will be ‘relieved’ if foreigners leave and the 
‘parasite economy’ comes to an end.81  
 
Conclusion 
For many years large expatriate populations have played not only a key role in the 
economic development of the Gulf monarchies but, as this article has demonstrated, have also 
contributed to the stability of their political systems.  Their presence as non-citizens, in such 
large numbers, has helped reinforce the elite status of most citizens in the region – an 
important and sometimes overlooked non-pecuniary legitimacy resource for the monarchies.  
Moreover, their employment-driven status has usually meant that they have adopted either an 
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apolitical or even pro-status quo stance.  This has become particularly notable in the wake of 
the so-called Arab Spring.  In some cases the perceived acquiescence and loyalty of 
expatriates to their host government has led to their selective naturalization in efforts to tip 
the balance against rebellious sections of the indigenous populations or, in more extreme 
cases, their outright co-option into security services.  Complicating the issue, however, have 
been the recently changing political and economic circumstances of the Gulf monarchies, 
especially since 2011.  Already in at least two of these states top-level decisions have been 
made to limit significantly and even immediately reduce expatriate populations due to 
accumulating pressures, especially related to urgent job creation schemes for nationals and 
strains resulting from increased government spending.  Such measures inevitably threaten to 
undo many of the historic political advantages the presence of expatriates has provided for 
these regimes and will likely exacerbate the growing uncertainties concerning the future of 
the Gulf monarchies. 
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